时间：11月26日下午3:30-5:00
地点：十大赌博正规信誉网址武东路校区114
演讲者：郑捷，副教授，清华大学
摘要：We study the entrant firm's optimal choice of competing channels in a local monopolistic market, under the framework of Salop model. In the first stage, the entrant rm decides whether to open an online store or to open an offline store, or to open both stores. In the second stage, the entrant firm competes against the incumbent firm that owns an offline store by simultaneously setting their prices. A consumer has to incur transport cost, which depends on the distance between the consumer and the offline store, in order to purchase from the offline store. However, consumers from different locations incur the same shipping cost when they purchase from the online store. We allow the difference of consumers' valuations between online purchase and offline purchase to be either positive or negative. We solve for equilibrium outcome under every scenario: (1) online versus offline; (2) offline versus offline; (3) online+offline versus offline, and we also completely characterize the parameter conditions under which each of the above 3 scenarios can be supported as the subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, we extend our setup by (i) allowing some consumers to be unaware of the online store, (ii) having more than one incumbent stores in the local market.